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Dutch flexicurity: the “normalisation” of
atypical work
Labour market performance
In the European flexicurity discourse, the Nether-
lands and Denmark are often referred to as flexicu-
rity examples (European Commission 2006). Dutch
flexicurity policies have been developed rather
deliberately and can generally be reconstructed as
the normalisation of atypical work while preserving
flexibility in the labour market.This approach, com-
bined with the relatively good labour market results
over the past years, served as an example at the
European level in the early stage of the flexicurity
policy-making process.
Recent performance indicators show the following:
in 2007,the Dutch employment rate was 74.3 percent
and the unemployment rate 3.2 percent, compared
to 64.5 percent and 7.1 percent respectively in the
27 EU member states (EU-27). In August 2008, the
unemployment rate decreased even further to 2.6,
and is now among the lowest in the European Union
(Statistics Netherlands 2008). In recent years, eco-
nomic growth has been modest to good and the
inflation has been rather low at 2.0 percent com-
pared to the EU average of 3.2 percent.Even now,in
the context of a world-wide financial crisis,the econ-
omy still grew by 3 percent in the second quarter of
2008, while the inflation increased to 3.1 percent in
September 2008 (Statistics Netherlands 2008).
October 2008 showed, however, a sharp decline in
both consumer and producer confidence.
In the Netherlands, contractual diversity, including
part-time work,fixed-term work and agency work,is
widespread. In 2007, 46.8 percent of the employed
Dutch labour force worked part-time, which repre-
sents a significant increase compared to the 38 per-
cent part-time employed in 1997 (Eurostat).It is also
much higher than the 18.2 percent part-time
employed in the EU-27 in 2007. In the Netherlands,
working part-time is even regarded as a normal and
desired type of employment, illustrated by the high
amount of part-time workers who report that they
voluntarily work in this type of employment.
Especially women work part-time (75 percent in the
Netherlands compared to 31 percent in EU-27 in
2006). Furthermore, the percentage of employees
with a contract of limited duration increased from
12.3 percent in 1997 to 18.1 percent in 2007, which is
higher than the EU-27 average of 14.5 percent in
2007 (Eurostat). Moreover, it is estimated that cur-
rently nearly 1 million workers conduct their activi-
ties outside the traditional employment relationship
(self-employed), which is about 12.4 percent of the
working population. In some sectors, this type of
employment is growing rapidly. In the construction
sector, for instance, the number of self-employed
workers has increased by 31 percent over the past
two years (Statistics Netherlands 2008).
Regulating and negotiating flexibility
Given the rather large number of atypical workers,a
very relevant question is how the needs for the secu-
rity of these workers are met. Security is provided in
several ways, depending on the type of flexibility a
worker faces. For part-time workers, the pro rata
temporis principle (in proportion to the time
worked) is strictly applied by law.1 This holds true
not only for the position of the employee under civil
* Tilburg University, the Netherlands. 1 See more comprehensively Visser et al. (2004).law, but also for social security legislation and enti-
tlements.Two laws are particularly relevant not only
to part-time workers but also to fixed-term workers:
the Prohibition of Discrimination by Working Hours
Act (Wet Verbod onderscheid arbeidsduur;WVOA)
and the Adjustment of Working Hours Act (Wet
Aanpassing Arbeidsduur; WAA). The former act
came into effect on 1 November 1996. One of the
consequences of its introduction was the addition of
Article 7:648 to the Dutch Civil Code.This article for-
bids employers to discriminate between employees
on the basis of a difference in working hours in the
conditions under which those employees enter,
extend or terminate a contract of employment,unless
there is objective justification for such discrimina-
tion. Clauses that conflict with this ban are void. If
the employer terminates the contract in contraven-
tion of the ban or terminates it because the employ-
ee has invoked this ban, the termination is subject to
annulment.The same ban also applies to government
employers, now that a stipulation to the same effect
has been incorporated into Article 125g of the
Central and Local Government Personnel Act.
The Adjustment of Working Hours Act came into
force on 1 June 2000. This act is the result of nearly
nine years of political negotiation. It represents a
very high-profile piece of legislation, as it gives
employees the right (albeit under certain conditions)
to unilaterally alter the terms of an already existing
employment contract.
With regard to agency workers, on-call workers and
the like, a new approach to labour market flexibility
and security was adopted at the end of 1995.At that
time, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and
Employment made a deliberate attempt in a memo-
randum called “Flexibility and Security” to strike a
better balance between flexibility and (social) secu-
rity. This memorandum contains an interrelated set
of starting points and proposals for modifying the
dismissal protection enjoyed by employees in stan-
dard employment relationships, abolishing the per-
mit system for temporary work agencies with respect
to their placement activities and enhancing the legal
position of temporary agency workers, whose rela-
tionship with the agency is to be considered, in prin-
ciple, a standard employment contract.
The Dutch coalition government (a coalition of
Labour, Liberals and Social Liberals at that time)
was unable to reach agreement on the flexibility and
security proposals. Subsequently, the Foundation of
Labour was asked for its advice on this matter. The
Foundation of Labour is a consultation and advisory
body at the central level, which was established at
the end of the Second World War. Its members con-
stitute the largest confederations of employers’ and
workers’ organisations. Unlike the Socio-Economic
Council, the Foundation of Labour has no indepen-
dent members or representatives appointed by the
crown. The Foundation of Labour is central to the
Dutch “consultation” economy, or the “Polder Mo-
del”, as it is called nowadays. It is an institution that
is remarkable for its strategies of positive-sum bar-
gaining.The pursuit of so-called “win-win”strategies
and results, as perceived from the point of view of
both workers and employers, is at the core of the
foundation.
Under the umbrella of the foundation, employees’
and employers’ confederations managed to draft a
detailed agreement on flexibility and security.
Moreover, at the same time, the employers’ organi-
sations, the trade unions and the non-profit-making
employment agency START reached an agreement
on regulating the legal position of temporary agency
workers after the new laws would come into force.
This collective agreement would run for five years.
On March 7 1997, the Flexibility and Security Bill
was submitted to the lower house of the Dutch par-
liament, together with the Allocation of Workers via
Intermediaries Bill, which provided for the abroga-
tion of permits for temporary work agencies.
Without much further debate, the new legislation
came into force on 1 January 1999.
The new law abolished the permit system for oper-
ating temp agencies. On the one hand, more rights
were attributed to flexible workforces. On the
other hand, more leeway was created for (prolong-
ing) fixed-term contracts. A key role was and is
being played by the collective labour agreements
in the temporary agency sector, concluded for the
respective periods of 1999–2003 and 2004–09.
Temporary agency workers have, depending on te-
nure, a right to a fixed-term or permanent contract
with the agency, to training facilities (individual
budget) and pension entitlements. After 26 weeks
(or earlier) of working for the same company, they
are entitled to the same wage as the employees of
that company. The hiring company saves on hiring
and firing costs, but pays more for a temporary
worker than for their own employees (as the costs
for the agency are added to the wage costs of the
agency worker).
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This example of a flexicurity policy clearly contains
an explicit and well-considered trade-off between
forms of flexibilisation (i.e., enhanced external
numerical flexibilisation) and forms of security for
weak groups (i.e., more employment and employa-
bility security for temporary agency workers and
other non-standard workers such as on-call work-
ers). Furthermore, it is safe to argue that this reform
could never have been launched and implemented
were it not for the joint efforts of the social partners
at both the central and the sectoral levels.
A more recent example of flexicurity policy is the
Life Course Savings scheme, which came into effect
in 2006.It enables workers to save income or time to
be spent on leave periods. Individuals can save a
maximum of 12 percent of yearly gross income up to
210 percent of their annual pay, for a maximum of
three years of leave (against 70 percent of the wage).
Employers may contribute to such a scheme, which
can be specified in collective agreements. The em-
ployee can save for periods of unpaid leave,e.g.,care
leave, sabbatical, terminal care, parental leave, train-
ing leave or early retirement. Collective bargaining
parties are expected to incorporate and facilitate the
Life Course Savings scheme into their agreements,
and employers are obliged to offer the Life Course
Savings scheme to their employees.
New challenges and new policy proposals
Current challenges in the Dutch labour market
Like any other country,the Netherlands continuous-
ly faces various labour market challenges and should
therefore take the necessary steps for improvement.
The European Commission’s recommendations to
the Netherlands point to the areas in which the
Netherlands is lagging behind (Council of the
European Union 2008). The latest recommendation
strongly urges the Netherlands to raise overall
labour supply, especially that of women, older work-
ers and disadvantaged groups.The overall number of
hours worked should also be raised. In previous
years, the reduction of the gender pay gap and the
reduction in rates of early school leaving were also
recommended.The OECD and the IMF (2008) have
made similar recommendations.
More specially, regulations and policies could be
improved in order to strengthen the position of spe-
cific groups in the labour market, in particular the
position of ethnic minorities that have difficulties
entering and progressing in the labour market.
Although unemployment among non-western non-
nationals decreased significantly in 2007, the unem-
ployment rate of 9.1 percent is still almost three
times higher than the unemployment rate under
Dutch nationals.2 In the age group of 15–25-year-
olds, the unemployment rate amounts to 15 percent
for non-western non-nationals and 8.1 percent for
nationals. Early school leaving is a problem, particu-
larly among non-nationals. Likewise, the unemploy-
ment rate of people with a low level of education is
considerably higher than the Dutch average.
Older workers constitute another vulnerable group.
Many of these workers have insufficient transition
and employment security,meaning that they lack the
security to make a timely transition to another job
when the need arises, e.g., in cases of company
restructuring. The weak labour-market position
becomes especially evident once older workers have
become unemployed. It usually takes them much
longer to find new employment, which increases the
risk of becoming long-term unemployed.Their posi-
tion is further weakened by the lack of investment of
Dutch companies in the skills and retraining of their
older workers (Bekker et al. 2008).This calls for the
development of a general and effective system of
transition and employment security that is not limit-
ed to large firms, but is also accessible to and afford-
able for small and medium enterprises.
A third urgent concern in the Dutch context involves
the career opportunities of women, including pay
gaps and the lack of women in top management of
companies and institutions. These poor career
opportunities are to a large extent related to the
effects of working part-time. The fact that part-time
work is a highly desired form of employment and
that longer working hours are required to warrant
the sustainability of the social security system makes
this an even larger challenge for the Netherlands.
A final concern,somewhat paradoxically,regards the
position of atypical workers in the Dutch labour
market.The growing part of the labour force that has
a temporary employment contract or is self-
employed, triggers new questions regarding their
2 Data from Statistics Netherlands on the basis of the national def-
inition of unemployment, which differs from the international Eu-
rostat definition.The main difference is that Statistics Netherlands
regards a person as unemployed only if that person is actively look-
ing for a job involving at least 12 hours a week.access to social security and the securities attached to
open-ended contracts. In general, atypical workers
have fewer rights to social security provisions, and
their participation in training and education is lower.
In addition,workers with a temporary contract do not
receive severance pay when their contract expires.
The position of individuals with a temporary contract
improves if they manage to obtain an open-ended
contract.The extent to which they succeed in making
this transition seems rather difficult to calculate. The
estimation is that in the Netherlands about 20 percent
of people with a temporary contract will have an
open-ended contract one year later.This percentage is
probably somewhat higher for temporary agency
workers.Especially young people make the transition
to open-ended contracts,whereas low- skilled workers
and those with a small part-time job face more diffi-
culties in obtaining a permanent contract (Zijl and
Van Leeuwen 2004).Research also shows that among
temporary agency workers in the Netherlands about
61 percent would like to have a permanent job. Of
these, 33 percent found a permanent job in 2004. Of
those who did not look for a permanent job, 18 per-
cent ended up in a job with an open-ended contract
(Statistics Netherlands 2006). Even though some re-
searchers would argue that this proves that atypical
work is not a dead-end street, this type of employ-
ment clearly does not work as a stepping-stone for all.
One study showed that although 25 percent of the
temporarily employed made a transition to a perma-
nent contract between 1991 and 2001, 20 percent of
this group became unemployed.
Proposals from the Committee on Labour Market
Participation
Given these labour market challenges and the Dutch
tradition of negotiated flexibility,one might expect a
new Dutch “package deal” in terms of a well-
defined, encompassing strategy to revisit and rede-
fine the flexibility-security nexus, guaranteeing the
future adaptability of workers and companies. Yet,
recent political debates have been characterised by a
rather one-sided and narrow focus on employment
protection legislation, leading to harsh confronta-
tions between employers and trade unions and prob-
lems within the government coalition. The employ-
ers, often with the support of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment, maintain that less strict
rules on dismissals will support employment creation
as a result of a reduction in anticipated firing costs.
The trade unions strongly criticise any such labour
law modification, since they believe this would not
contribute to employment creation and would only
substantially and effectively reduce employee pro-
tection. It seems that social partners are less confi-
dent today regarding the possibility of finding mutu-
ally beneficial solutions than they were in the 1990s.
A recent initiative to come up with a broad approach
to labour market issues is the instalment of the
Committee on Labour Market Participation by the
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. In June
2008 this committee published proposals and recom-
mendations for raising the labour market participa-
tion rate to 80 percent by 2016.3 The proposals sug-
gest labour market reforms while simultaneously
alleviating workers’ feelings of insecurity, especially
concerning the risk of losing their job. The commit-
tee’s report advocates a three-track approach.
The first track addresses the necessity of facilitating
and stimulating,as soon as possible,vulnerable groups
to find a job or to work more hours. The proposals
encourage employers to hire long-term benefit recip-
ients on the basis of temporary wage cost subsidies,
including a so-called no risk policy and secondment
arrangements.Benefit recipients will have a participa-
tion obligation,and part-time workers will be encour-
aged through tax incentives to extend the number of
working hours. At the same time, facilities for com-
bining work and family are being improved,including
career, working-time and childcare arrangements.
The second track addresses more fundamental pro-
posals for labour market reform. The basic philoso-
phy of the second track is to give employers,employ-
ees and municipalities more responsibility at a
decentralised level for employability and transition-
al security of workers. Additional decentralised
responsibility is matched with additional instruments
for these decentralised parties to work on employa-
bility and employment security. Employment insur-
ance and a work budget are the two key elements in
this second track. Concerning the Unemployment
Insurance Scheme, the proposal is to turn this
scheme into employment insurance, geared towards
the prevention of unemployment and a smooth tran-
sition to a new job. Employers are required to con-
tinue to pay 80 to 100 percent of the worker’s wage
payments for a maximum of six months after giving
notice to the worker. During this so-called transfer
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period,the worker can fully devote himself or herself
to finding new employment. If this time span does
not suffice, the worker is dismissed, but not before
the efforts of both the employer and worker have
been evaluated.The unemployed worker then enters
a reintegration scheme where the sector of industry
bears the financial responsibility and where private
or public reintegration organisations can be relied
upon. If a new job still has not been obtained after
another six months, the responsibility is shifted to
the municipality. This new system also benefits the
employer, as employment protection legislation is
eased by abolishing the current pre-emptive testing
of dismissals, conducted by the public employment
services.At the same time, during the notice period,
the worker may petition the courts to challenge the
reason the employer gives for the prospective dis-
missal, although this notice period is shortened to
only one month. Moreover, as indicated above, a
gatekeeper (probably the public labour office) eval-
uates the efforts of the employer to help the employ-
ee find a new job during the transfer period.
Regarding the work budget, the proposal suggests
the introduction of a Work Budget that replaces the
current Dutch Life Course Savings scheme, as
explained above, and another tax-favoured employ-
ee savings system. The Work Budget has a larger
scope than life-course saving and can also be utilised
to provide additional income in case of job transi-
tions, setting up one’s own business, part-time retire-
ment, training, unpaid leave, a new job or position
with lower earnings. The Work Budget is also avail-
able to flexible workers, such as workers with a
fixed-term contract. The Work Budget is personal
and portable, which means that the worker can
transfer it from one job to another. It is designed to
maintain the worker’s employability level and can be
used to finance the actual costs of training and
schooling. Both the worker and the employer make
financial contributions to the Work Budget. The
most important sources for the employer’s contribu-
tions are current severance payments.In the new sys-
tem with employment insurance, severance pay is
paid in addition to the payments during the transfer
period only in special situations in which employers
do not meet their contractual and other responsibil-
ities towards workers who are laid off. Lower sever-
ance payments thus provide room for contributions
into the Work Budget. This makes workers less vul-
nerable to the risk of firm-specific shocks: if the firm
that employs them goes bankrupt, workers have
already received payments in their Work Budget.
The third and last track includes the proposal to raise
the official pension age as of 2016 (by one month per
year) in line with the population’s increasing life
expectancy. The goal is to counteract the decline of
the labour supply, caused by a shrinking working
population. Currently, Dutch people are entitled to a
state pension at the age of 65. The recommended
reform would gradually raise this age to 67.
The three tracks are to a certain degree interlinked:
especially the second track is essential for the other
two tracks.It ensures that the employment gains pro-
duced by the first track are in fact sustainable with-
out substantial public spending on wage subsidies.
As regards the third track,by enhancing the employ-
ability of older workers and the operation of the
labour market for these workers, the second track
will help to raise the effective retirement age in the
future in line with increased longevity.
Conclusions
In the past, the Netherlands has served as an exam-
ple of a European country with good labour market
performance and flexicurity strategies. As codified
in, for example, the Act on Flexibility and Security,
this approach can be characterised, in hindsight, as
the normalisation of atypical work, without doing
away with flexibility. The social partners played an
important role in developing this approach.
However, new labour market challenges have sur-
faced. In view of the trends of globalisation, the age-
ing of society and the current financial crisis, there is
a real urgency to face these challenges and to come
up with a renewed, broadly based strategy to im-
prove labour market performance and enhance la-
bour market participation.
This paper has discussed recent policy proposals that
were developed by the Dutch Committee on Labour
Market Participation to reform the labour market in
the Netherlands. These proposals can be portrayed
as concrete suggestions to further develop a flexicu-
rity pathway towards better transition security and
more labour market mobility, i.e., the second ideal
typical pathway as identified by the European
Commission in its Communication on Flexicurity.4
In a concrete sense, the proposals illustrate the way
in which a particular member state, i.e., the Nether-
4 Dated 27 June 2007 (COM (2007)0359).lands, can continue its own path towards more flexi-
bility combined with more employment and income
security by taking notice of its particular path depen-
dence (institutions, culture and political system) and
responding to its particular challenges.The proposals
are consistent with the traditionally high involve-
ment of the Dutch social partners in employment
and labour market policies and the large role played
by individual employers. Moreover, the approach
builds on regulatory policies based on financial
incentives (mandatory continuation of pay during a
certain period of time) that have proved rather suc-
cessful in other domains of labour market policy and
social security since the early 1990s, especially the
reduction and prevention of disability cases and sick-
ness absenteeism. The same holds true for the vari-
ous public-private forms of collaboration,implemen-
tation and reintegration that have evolved in the
Dutch labour market.
We wish to end this concluding section by very
briefly addressing two major questions. The first is
whether these reform proposals can be expected to
further develop Dutch flexicurity by enhancing the
adaptability of both workers and citizens? The
answer to this question is not straightforward. The
Dutch Committee clearly acknowledges that the
transformation to the new system should take place
slowly and gradually. Support from all major stake-
holders,political parties,government,employers and
workers and their organisations, courts and various
labour market services is indispensable. At this
moment (October 2008), the debate on the propos-
als, which were released in June 2008, has not pro-
gressed far yet.In their consultations,the social part-
ners and government gave priority to securing wage
moderation in view of a possible economic downturn
as a consequence of the global financial crisis.
A second important question involves the relevancy
of the proposed reform to other countries. Policy
learning and mutual learning are key concepts with-
in the European Employment Strategy. A straight-
forward transplantation of a country’s policies and
reforms to another country is generally seen as
impossible and undesirable. Looking for inspiration
rather than imitation seems to be the best strategy in
this respect. To illustrate, the second track of the
described Dutch proposals have been informed and
inspired by the Austrian system of dismissal regula-
tion and severance pay (Abfertigung). Many mem-
ber states might have an interest in taking notice of
the proposals from the viewpoint of mapping out
their own distinct pathway towards flexicurity. This
applies especially to those member states that con-
sider offering more employment and income securi-
ty in their labour markets while simultaneously
encouraging job mobility and transitions.
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